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Abstract 
 
The expansion of industrial mining in the war-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of 
the Congo has provoked resistance from those depending directly and indirectly on 
artisanal mining for their livelihood, and has been faced with violent actions from 
politico-military entrepreneurs. By analyzing the interplay between armed and social 
mobilization against industrial mining in the FiziÐKabambare region, this paper sheds 
new light on the relations between industrial mining, resistance and militarization. It 
argues that the presence and practices of industrial mining companies reinforce the 
overall power position of politico-military entrepreneurs. This occurs both directly, by 
efforts to co-opt them, and indirectly, by fuelling dynamics of conflict, insecurity and 
protection that crucially underpin these entrepreneursÕ dominance. At the same time, 
due to the eastern CongoÕs convoluted political opportunity structure for contentious 
action, politico-military entrepreneurs enlarge the scope for social mobilization 
against industrial mining. They offer a potential counterweight to repressive 
authorities and provide collective action frames that inspire contentious politics. Yet 
they also harness popular resistance for personal or particularistic purposes, while 
extorting the very people they claim to defend. These complexities reflect the 
ambiguous nature and versatility of both armed and social mobilization in the eastern 
Congo, which transcend socially constructed boundaries like the rural/urban, 
state/non-state and military/civilian divides.   
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Introduction 
 
In April 2014, Bembe armed fighters assaulted the town of Misisi, a burgeoning 
artisanal gold mining site located in Fizi territory in South Kivu province, in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Getting close to the compound of CASA 
Minerals, a Virgin Islands incorporated company engaged in gold exploration, the 
assailants framed their attack as a protest against the alleged sale to CASA of ÔtheirÕ 
hill, the gold-rich Akyanga Mountain, seen as part of the BabembeÕs ancestral 
grounds. About a year earlier, a retired general of the Congolese armed forces sent his 
	
2	
armed bodyguards to occupy a part of the concession of the Canadian industrial gold 
mining company Banro in Namoya, located approximately 150 kilometers west of 
Misisi in Kabambare territory in Maniema province. He presented this action as a way 
to express disapproval with BanroÕs alleged surpassing of its concession limits, and 
the derisory compensation offered to expropriated peasants. At the face of it, these 
actions constitute violent reactions against the intensifying expansion of industrial 
mining in the eastern Congo, which threatens the livelihoods and ways of life of 
hundreds of thousands of people depending both directly and indirectly on artisanal 
mining. When taking a closer look at the politico-military entrepreneurs initiating 
these actions, however, they are difficult to unambiguously qualify as Luddites 
Ôraging against the machine(s)Õ to defend marginalized populations, even if they do 
enable and inspire resistance against industrial mining. This paper provides an insight 
into the complexity of the relationships between politico-military entrepreneurialism, 
social mobilization, and the expansion of industrial mining amidst violent conflict. As 
such, it contributes to debates on the nexus between mining and militarization and 
between mining and resistance, connecting two bodies of literature that have hitherto 
been in limited dialogue.  
In the FiziÐKabambare region, industrial mining fuels the militarization of the 
political economy, but mostly indirectly. Crucially, it enkindles and aggravates the 
conflicts and insecurity that prompt people to solicit protection from politico-military 
entrepreneurs, in this way reinforcing the latterÕs power position. This position, in 
turn, allows these entrepreneurs to create space for contentious action in the face of 
repressive authorities, including by diffusing collective action frames. Yet politico-
military entrepreneurs also ÔappropriateÕ the social mobilization they help activate, for 
instance, by harnessing it to demand increased contributions from companies. These 
findings call for a holistic Ôcontentious politicsÕ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) approach to 
the study of mobilization against industrial mining. Such an approach entails 
examining the links between the contentious performances and repertoires of both 
armed and non-armed actors, and how these links shape and are shaped by political 
opportunity structures and processes of framing.  
The paper is structured as follows. It first reviews the literature on the 
interplay between resistance, industrial mining and militarization in low-income 
countries. Subsequently, it analyzes the CongoÕs militarized political-economic order, 
and the opportunities and difficulties this order presents for collective contentious 
action and the expansion of industrial mining. The next part focuses on the 
militarization of the Fizi and Kabambare areas, and its relation to the expansion of 
and resistance against industrial mining. The concluding section considers the paperÕs 
main findings against recent scholarship on social movements in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and makes a case for a holistic Ôcontentious politicsÕ approach. 
The data and analysis provided in the paper are based on periodic fieldwork in 
the Fizi and Kabambare areas between 2010 and 2016, as part of wider research on 
the militarization of the eastern CongoÕs political economy. Individual and group 
interviews were held with civilian and military authorities, armed group leaderships, 
civil society organizations, representatives of mining cooperatives and corporations, 
and other economic operators. The fieldwork data were complemented with and 
triangulated by academic literature, international and Congolese media articles, and 
reports of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations. Since the 
presented field data are always derived from multiple sources, they are not attributed 
to one specific interview, unless information was conveyed by a single source.  
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Mining, resistance, and militarization 
 
Throughout history, dislocations, dispossession and other social transformations 
generated by industrialization have provoked broad Ôcontentious repertoiresÕ (Tilly 
and Tarrow 2007, 11), including violent action. Destructive attacks on textile 
machines in the English Midlands at the start of the 19th century by the followers of 
the mythical Ludd, Ôthe General of the Army of RedressersÕ (Sale 2006, 73), are but 
one of the most famous examples. Similar to Luddism, resistance against industrial 
mining is commonly informed by a plethora of (perceived) threats. As theorized by 
Bebbington et al. (2008), these concern both threats to the material aspects of 
livelihoods and the immaterial losses that are incurred when livelihoods are 
disarticulated. Such losses often stem from a process that Habermas (1987) describes 
as Ôthe colonization of the life-worldÕ, or the encroachment of outside forces on 
peopleÕs daily lives that are felt to be beyond their control. The experience of 
colonization generally results from either Ôaccumulation by exploitationÕ, which is 
effectuated within the framework of capitalist relations, or Ôaccumulation by 
dispossessionÕ (Harvey 2003), which involves other forms of coercion than those 
inherent to capitalist labor relations (Bebbington et al. 2008).  
 Leading to both types of accumulation, the expansion of large-scale mining 
(LSM) generally gives rise to a wide array of forms of contentious action. This is no 
different in low-income countries, where a colonial past often adds layers of 
signification to the notion of the ÔcolonizationÕ of the life-world, especially where it 
involves transnational corporations. In most of these contexts, LSM poses a direct and 
indirect threat to the livelihoods and life-worlds of peasants and those depending on 
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). These groups are commonly displaced, 
dislocated and dispossessed of their land, territory and resources, or suffer from the 
environmental and wider socio-economic effects of LSM (e.g. Fisher 2007; Hilson 
and Yakovleva 2007; Holden, Nadeau and Jacobson 2011). The resulting conflicts, 
which sometimes turn violent (Aubynn 2009; Carstens and Hilson 2009), tend to be 
aggravated by divergent interpretations of the nature and legitimacy of claims to 
property and resources. Moreover, they often enmesh with existing processes of social 
exclusion and marginalization, which generate differential access to political and 
financial capital, technology and information. Such institutionalized inequalities 
strongly impact the possibilities for and nature of social mobilization (Hilson 2002; 
Fisher 2007; Urkidi 2011).  
A growing body of literature studies mobilization against LSM from a social 
movements angle. This literature focuses on dimensions like protest movementsÕ 
contentious repertoires; their internal coherence and conflicts; the multi-scalar 
networks of which they form part; and how these networks shape and are shaped by 
places, forms of identification and corporate or state-led counter-mobilization (e.g. 
Bebbington et al. 2008; Urkidi 2011). Despite HarveyÕs (2006, 165) observation that 
Ôstruggles against primitive accumulation could provide the seedbed of discontent for 
insurgent movementsÕ, few studies comprehensively analyze the links between 
resistance against LSM and violent conflict. An exception is Holden and Jacobson 
(2007), who distinguish a number of mechanisms by which LSM feeds into armed 
conflict, three of which were deemed most pertinent. The first relates to looting and 
extortion, and partly builds on RossÕs (1999) argument that the failure of states to 
enforce property rights makes companies willing to pay Ôprotection rentsÕ to extra-
legal organizations. This applies particularly to LSM companies, which have high 
fixed costs and are immobile (Le Billon 2001). The second mechanism concerns the 
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militarization of mining areas, or the increased presence of state security services and 
private security companies. High concentrations of security personnel may contribute 
to stifling opposition and augment human rights violations, thereby reinforcing 
support for insurgents (Le Billon 2004). Militarization therefore overlaps with the 
third mechanism, ÔgrievanceÕ, relating to the ways in which the negative effects of 
industrial exploitation may prompt people to take up arms to protest the status quo (cf. 
Le Billon 2001). Since there is no linear causal path from conflict to collective 
organized violence (Brubaker and Laitin 1998), the grievance mechanism can never 
be merely assumed, but must always be empirically demonstrated. Holden, Nadeau 
and Jacobson (2011) present one such empirical case study, focusing on the armed 
branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines. This organization attacks the 
installations of LSM companies, which they label Ômonopoly capitalistsÕ and 
Ôimperialist plunderersÕ, in the name of the defense of the ancestral domain of 
particular indigenous groups. These attacks have provoked increasing deployment of 
the national army and paramilitary forces around mining sites, leading to the 
asphyxiation of opposition and the proliferation of human rights violations. The result 
is growing sympathy for and possibly enrolment in the communist insurgency.  
This paper provides another in-depth empirical study of the links between 
militarization and mobilization against LSM amidst violent conflict, focusing on one 
sub-area of the eastern Congo (the Fizi-Kabambare region). It works with a fine-
grained conceptualization of ÔmilitarizationÕ, seeing it not in terms of the quantity of 
armed actors present within a particular context, but as referring to a dominant 
position for such actors in non-military domains of social life (Thee 1980). It focuses 
on two dimensions of the interplay between organized armed mobilization (relating to 
insurgent and other armed group activity) and social mobilization against LSM, seen 
as collective contentious action not involving armed group activity (but which may be 
violent). The first is Ôcollective action framesÕ or Ôaction-oriented set[s] of beliefs and 
meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social 
movement organizationÕ (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). The second is the Ôpolitical 
opportunity structureÕ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 49) for collective contentious action, 
which is discussed in the following.  
 
 
The political opportunity structure of a militarized political-economic order 
 
 
The CongoÕs history is marked by periodic social and armed mobilization, reflecting 
and giving rise to periods of social, economic and political upheaval. The intense 
accumulation by both exploitation and dispossession that marked the colonial era 
provided fertile ground for social movements with an anticolonial dimension, which 
often had syncretic visions and occasionally turned violent. A telling example is the 
social unrest among mineworkers in Katanga province in the 1940s, where, according 
to Higginson (1988: 99), Ôagrarian and industrial rebels often made common causeÕ, 
and Ôneither ÒarchaicÓ nor ÒmodernÓ values triumphed completely independent of 
each other during the protestsÕ.  
The social tensions and fissures created by the colonial political economy 
continued to shape the first years of the CongoÕs independence after 1960. Prime 
Minister Patrice LumumbaÕs pledge to steer an anti-imperialist course scared foreign 
investors and the wider ÔWestern blocÕ that had materialized in the context of the 
Cold War. His subsequent assassination, with the implication of both the USA and 
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Belgium, helped foment a climate of unrest that eventually sparked two insurgencies: 
that of Pierre Mulele in Kwilu and the Simba rebellion originating in Kivu, the 
easternmost part of the Congo. While the Kwilu insurgency was unambiguously 
identified as a case of Ôrural radicalismÕ (Weiss 1967, xxii), the Simba rebellion was 
an ambiguous project, involving different social groups with heterogeneous 
worldviews and beliefs. Although articulated in universal discourses of anti-
imperialism and nationalism, in practice, local and particularistic conflicts and 
interests heavily shaped the rebellion (Verhaegen 1966). For Che Guevara, who 
arrived in Fizi to reinforce the insurgency with a small contingent of Cuban 
revolutionaries in 1965, the rebellion was plagued by the absence of revolutionary 
awareness among the peasant rank and file, whom he described as Ôcompletely rawÕ 
(Guevara 2011, 221). Guevara also lamented its deficient leadership, stating about 
one of its leaders, Laurent-Dsir Kabila, that he lacked Ôrevolutionary seriousness, an 
ideology that can be a guide to action and a spirit of sacrifice that accompanies oneÕs 
actionsÕ (238Ð239). Similar deficiencies were visible in the revolutionary organization 
that Kabila developed after returning to Fizi in 1967 the Parti de la rvolution 
populaire (PRP), which would stay headquartered in Hewa Bora in the Lulenge sector 
up to 1984. Engaging in the trafficking of ivory and gold to finance the rebellion, 
economic activities increasingly became objectives in themselves (Wilungula 1997). 
Among the dozens of armed groups that emerged during the First (1996Ð1997) 
and Second (1998Ð2003) Congo Wars, numerous were inspired by the discourses and 
practices of the Simba rebels. This applied in particular to Mai Mai militias, who 
fought the rebel movement Rassemblement congolais pour la dmocratie (RCD), 
which occupied large parts of the eastern Congo. Being backed by Rwanda, the 
rebellion was perceived to be a Ôforeign invasionÕ of Rwandophones (Kinyarwanda 
speakers) aiming to dispossess self-styled autochthones (ÔnativeÕ populations) of their 
lands, local authority and natural resources. Many of the CongoÕs Rwandophone 
populations Ðlong seen as ÔimmigrantsÕ Ð had joined the rebellion, confirming their 
status as ÔforeignersÕ in self-styled autochthonsÕ eyes. These views were also reflected 
in the discourses of Mai-Mai groups, which presented the war Ð in part due to RCDÕs 
engagement in the coercive exploitation of mineral resources Ð as the umpteenth time 
the Congo had fallen victim to Ôresources plunderÕ by (neo)imperialist Ôforeign 
powersÕ (Jackson 2006).  
While the belligerents of the Second Congo War adopted a peace accord in 
2003, fighting in the east has continued since. This region currently consists of a 
patchwork of zones under shifting control of over 80 different armed groups and the 
Congolese national army. Many of the smaller armed groups continue to operate 
under the ÔMai-MaiÕ banner and are closely tied to particular ethno-regional identities. 
These groups employ similar mobilizing narratives as during the Congo Wars, 
drawing on notions of autochthony, ethnicity, self-defense and spirituality, including 
beliefs in the spirits of the ancestors, while also using discourses of anti-imperialism 
and government critique reminiscent of the Simba and Mulele rebellions (Hoffmann 
2015; Verweijen 2015a). The multifaceted nature of Mai-Mai groupsÕ discourses 
facilitates their embedding in multi-scalar political-economic networks that 
encompass different categories of civilians, including local authorities, 
businesspeople, politicians, and state agents. These networks link the military group, 
often operating in remote forest or mountain areas, to civilian actors based in the 
national and provincial capital cities, and sometimes in neighboring countries and 
beyond (Verweijen 2016). Thus, armed group networks straddle the state and non-
state spheres, as well as zones qualified as ÔurbanÕ and those seen as ÔruralÕ, notions 
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that are considered herein Ôcategories of practiceÕ (Wachsmuth 2014) that correspond 
to rural and urban imaginaries specific to the Congo. Both types of spaces have been 
affected by processes of militarization, the core dynamics of which are manifested in 
the eastern Congo as a whole, although having different socio-spatial articulations per 
time-space context (Verweijen 2015b).   
 A key driver of militarization is rampant physical, socio-economic and 
political insecurity, which partly stems from and feeds into omnipresent conflicts 
between and among individuals, families, communities, elite networks, and state 
services. Both insecurity and conflicts drive people, either on an individual basis or as 
a group, to solicit forms of protection from politico-military entrepreneurs, that is, 
powerful figures Ð having either a civilian or military status, and encompassing both 
state (e.g. army officers) and non-state (e.g. armed groups) actors Ð that mobilize 
armed violence to further their ends (Raeymaekers 2014). While intended to 
overcome insecurity, the system of protection generates considerable conflicts and 
insecurity itself. Not only do protection relations often have coercive undertones, they 
also tend to nourish fierce competition among both providers and solicitors of 
protection. Moreover, given that protection thrives in insecure environments, 
protection providers have limited incentives to eradicate insecurity (Gambetta 1993). 
For these reasons, interlocking dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection 
importantly underpin politico-military entrepreneursÕ position of dominance 
(Verweijen 2015b).  
The militarization of KivuÕs political-economic order has important 
consequences for the political opportunity structure for collective contentious action. 
For Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 57), this structure consists of six elements: (1) the 
multiplicity of independent centers of power; (2) openness to new actors; (3) the 
instability of current political alignments; (4) the availability of influential 
allies/supporters to challengers; (5) the regimeÕs repression or facilitation of collective 
claim making; and (6) changes in any of these elements. In relation to the first four 
dimensions, it can be observed that the eastern CongoÕs fragmented political-military 
landscape encompasses multiple semi-autonomous centers of power that maintain 
variegated ties to the political center, which is dominated by the presidential 
patronage network. Due to ongoing competition and constant realignments, the 
relations between the political center and local centers of power, as well as those 
within the latter category, are relatively fluid (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2008). 
The result, however, is not a very open political settlement. Given the militarized and 
patronage-based nature of politics, only those knowing how to manipulate armed 
force and/or having connections to either the presidential patronage network or 
regional elite networks (stretching into neighboring countries) can reinforce their 
position (Verweijen 2016).  
For political actors engaging in contentious action, this convoluted political 
configuration circumscribes the choice of allies or supporters: without backing from 
figures that are able to manipulate violence or have connections to powerful political 
networks, opportunities to effectuate change are limited. In fact, not having 
connections with politico-military entrepreneurs makes contentious action dangerous, 
as it renders contesters vulnerable to repressive action by the authorities or competing 
power networks. Government repression mostly targets opposition parties or pro-
government politicians deemed no longer loyal, but may also be directed against non-
party movements or serve to quell ad hoc contentious action (ICG 2010). While 
repression is generalized and has rapidly intensified over the last years, it is not 
systematic. Rather, state coercion is unequally distributed (focusing on political, 
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administrative and commercial core areas) and erratic. The security servicesÕ 
capabilities for comprehensive surveillance and monitoring are limited, as they have 
deficient systems of information gathering and diffusion, and a low capacity for rapid 
interventions. Consequently, they often operate through deterrence, trying to set an 
example via occasional disproportionate violence. Additionally, both the security and 
administrative apparatus are fragmented and subject to internal power competition. 
These features widen citizensÕ space for maneuver vis--vis state agencies, allowing 
them to play off one agency or faction against another (Verweijen 2015b). 
The possibilities for and nature of contentious collective action are also shaped 
by the protracted conflicts, insecurity and volatility that mark the eastern Congo, 
which reinforce the salience of pragmatic and utilitarian calculations. Political actors 
often seize opportunities for immediate, individual gain, to the detriment of securing 
longer-term (but due to volatility, often far from guaranteed) collective benefits 
(Verweijen 2015b). Moreover, in combination with the unsettledness of the social 
environment, the drive to maximize opportunities induces a constant switching 
between different social roles, discursive registers and social networks (cf. Vigh 
2006). Such flexibility and versatility may prohibit lasting and stable positions of 
opposition. Similar effects are generated by the omnipresence of conflicts, which 
hamper broad-based coalitions of resistance, and by the salience of personalized and 
informal politics. The emphasis on the informal may prompt groups striving for 
change to negotiate arrangements with elites in private rather than to seek public 
confrontations. Informal and private deals, however, increase the likelihood of co-
optation and side switching (de Waal and Ibreck 2013). In the following, it is further 
described how these various dimensions of the eastern CongoÕs political opportunity 
structure for collective action shape responses to the intensifying expansion of 
industrial mining. 
 
 
Expanding industrial mining in a volatile setting 
 
Industrial mining in the Congo first emerged under the Belgian colonial regime 
(1908Ð60) that succeeded the Congo Free State (1885Ð1908). It was dominated by 
chartered companies linked to foreign financial groups, which constituted Ôstates 
within a stateÕ, being enclaves of self-administration with their own infrastructure and 
facilities (Fetter 1973). In Kivu, industrial mining of mostly gold and cassiterite (a tin 
ore) was developed by the business group of Belgian baron douard Empain, which 
had received vast land and mining concessions in exchange for creating a rail and 
waterway system (Hillman 1997). Industrial mining in Kivu would however never 
attain the same importance as copper and cobalt mining in Katanga, which became 
the CongoÕs economic powerhouse. This situation remained unchanged in the 
postcolonial era. In fact, industrial mining in Kivu steadily diminished under the 
weight of the ongoing contraction of the formal economy from the mid-1970s 
onwards. At the same time, artisanal mining, including in parts of now inactive 
industrial concessions, grew in importance, in particular after its legalization in 1982 
(Vwakyanakazi 1991). After 1976, most of these concessions were controlled by 
Socit minire et industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI), owned in majority by Groupe 
Empain and for 28% by the Congolese state (de Failly 2000). 
In the mid-1990s, the Congolese government tried to privatize parts of the 
crumbling industrial mining sector, which drew decreasing interest from its main 
investors. However, the outbreak of the First Congo War in 1996 interrupted 
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negotiations and eventually forced potential investors to do business with the new 
president, Laurent-Dsir Kabila, who assumed power in May 1997. But Kabila did 
not always respect earlier deals, sometimes invoking the same anti-imperialist 
discourses as during his time in the rebellion in Fizi.  For instance, he cancelled the 
concessions of the Canadian mining corporation Banro, which had earlier obtained 
SOMINKIÕs gold titles. It was only in 2003, after Joseph Kabila had replaced his 
father as president in the wake of the latterÕs assassination, that Banro managed to 
regain its mining rights (Geenen 2014). 
The settlement with Banro was indicative of Kabila juniorÕs efforts to create a 
more hospitable investment climate for industrial mining, with the encouragement of 
the World Bank (Mazalto 2005). Together with the formal end to the war in 2003 and 
a rise in the world gold price, this change in policy environment prompted numerous 
companies to launch exploration activities in the east, despite ongoing violence. One 
of the first to move in was Banro, which started in 2004 and 2005 in two of its four 
concessions, namely, Namoya (Maniema) and Twangiza (South Kivu). In 2012, it 
commenced production in Twangiza, and in January 2016 in Namoya. Several other 
companies, including CASA and AngloGold Ashanti, have followed suit. These 
companies, however, struggle to navigate the complex politicalÐmilitary environment 
of the eastern Congo. They face in particular the following difficulties: (1) insecurity 
related to militarization; (2) resistance and discontent from those depending directly 
and indirectly on ASM; and (3) competing local power networks that vie for drawing 
benefits from companiesÕ presence (Geenen 2014; Geenen and Claessens 2013; 
Geenen and Hnke 2014). As the issue of militarization will be addressed in the next 
section, the focus here is on resistance and local elite competition.  
When involving a partial or total stop of ASM, the expansion of LSM 
threatens the livelihoods and life-worlds of a broad range of groups. Aside from those 
directly involved in ASM as diggers, traders, and pit-owners or managers, a host of 
groups depend on ASM in an indirect manner: peasants and traders in consumer 
goods; the service sector (e.g. bars, restaurants, sex-work); customary chiefs who are 
considered to (customarily) own the soil and subsoil, entitling them to levy taxes; and 
a bewildering array of administrative and security services engaging in more and less 
legal ÔtaxationÕ, extortion and other forms of revenue generation around mining sites. 
These various groups invest the surplus from ASM in other sectors such as real estate, 
trade and the hotel business, which are often concentrated in zones qualified as 
ÔurbanÕ. Hence, ASM is not an isolated sector of ÔruralÕ economies, but interwoven 
with KivuÕs political economy as a whole. 
While the material aspects of livelihoods are the most immediate concern, 
LSM-induced prohibitions to mining are not merely experienced in terms of material 
loss. As research by Geenen (2014) demonstrates, artisanal miners in the Congo value 
their ways of work and life. Drawing on alternative conceptualizations of social 
justice and land ownership than those enshrined in legislation and official policy, they 
consider being chased away a violation of their rights. Furthermore, people 
originating from the area where industrial concessions are located often lament the 
loss of their ancestral grounds, which hold spiritual value to them due to the 
connection with the spirits of the ancestors buried in the ground. This connection to 
the soil may lead resistance to be articulated in discourses of autochthony. But the 
practices of LSM companies, seen to symbolize ÔWestern wealthÕ, are generally also 
viewed in the light of the CongoÕs history of natural resources plunder by foreign 
forces. As a result, they become framed in terms of (neo)colonialism and imperialism 
(Geenen and Verweijen 2017).  
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Due to the importance of immaterial values and the context of multifaceted 
injustice and poverty, the displaced and dispossessed rarely experience companiesÕ 
efforts to offer compensation, such as cash payments per disowned field, sufficient or 
adequate. The same applies to measures to provide alternative jobs, whether through 
being employed as a day laborer by mining companies, or via the vocational training 
and development initiatives provided under the banner of Ôcorporate social 
responsibilityÕ. These efforts have proven largely insufficient to offset the livelihoods 
losses incurred by the closure of artisanal mining sites. Moreover, the offered work, in 
particular day laboring, is generally seen as inferior to ASM (Geenen 2014; Geenen 
and Claessens 2013). Disappointment and disagreements also surround the cahier des 
charges, a convention between company and ÔcommunityÕ that lists (promised) 
contributions to ÔdevelopmentÕ, like building roads, schools and health care centers. 
These contributions are often considered to be insufficient, to take too long to 
materialize or to be badly executed.  
Popular discontent is aggravated by local politics and elite manipulation, 
which undermine companiesÕ efforts at compensation, ÔdevelopmentÕ promotion and 
alternative livelihood provision. Local elites vie for controlling the distribution of the 
economic opportunities created by LSM, including by claiming to Ôrepresent the 
populationÕ (Geenen and Hnke 2014; Geenen and Verweijen 2017). The resulting 
conflicts are central to what Hardin (2011, S113) calls Ôconcessionary politicsÕ, 
describing the local political dynamics generated by the presence of concession 
companies. These dynamics are characterized by complex and ongoing negotiations, 
the politics of patronage and co-optation, and Ôfields of territorialized identity politics 
that tend toward relationships of rivalry and alliance across groups for redistribution 
of wealth through services, gifts, and performances of collective contestation or 
celebrationÕ.  
In Namoya, concessionary politics entered a new phase after Banro shut down 
all ASM and farming activity on its concessions in 2013. As a result, an estimated 
8,000Ð10,000 miners, several hundred peasants and their families lost their main 
source of livelihood overnight. While the company offered alternative housing to a 
part of the displaced and promised to assist with the creation of a new artisanal 
mining site and cooperative, the implementation of these initiatives is believed to 
have been manipulated by BanroÕs most trusted local collaborator, the chief of 
Salamabila sector (the highest local administrative authority). Not only did the chief 
appoint a person who is loyal to him as head of the new mining cooperative, when 
allocating the housing, he purportedly favored his own networks to the detriment of 
the intended beneficiaries. Since the sector chief is close to the governor of Maniema 
province and the CongoÕs (now former) prime minister, both of whom are part of the 
presidential patronage network, people believe it is difficult to hold him to account. 
His alleged penchant for intimidating those trying to counter him further reinforces 
this feeling.  
Elites in Kivu have also attempted to manipulate contentious collective action 
against LSM, whether by promoting or repressing it (Geenen 2014). Over the past 
years, both Misisi and Kabambare have seen a flurry of contentious performances 
against CASA and Banro. This social mobilization has generally been fluid and 
fragmented, consisting of ad hoc, episodic actions, with limited sustained 
coordination between the involved groups, and almost no supra-local involvement. 
Moreover, these groups have expressed different and differently framed demands and 
grievances, which hover between a total rejection of LSM to demands for ÔinclusionÕ 
(Geenen and Verweijen 2017). In Namoya and surroundings, people have for instance 
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practiced non-collaboration and non-compliance (e.g. artisanal miners entering the 
companyÕs concession at night to dig gold); engaged in covert protest (e.g. 
distributing anti-Banro pamphlets); voiced opposition during meetings with Banro 
community liaison officers and at the Forum communautaire (the platform created to 
mediate between Banro and Ôthe communityÕ), addressed letters and petitions to 
higher authorities, and held marches pacifiques (peaceful marches) and marches de 
colre (marches of anger), sometimes combined with sit-ins. While mostly 
concerning non-violent activity, these protests have occasionally turned violent.  
In January 2016, local customary chiefs and the umbrella of civil society 
organizations of Salamabila organized a protest march that found broad support. This 
march culminated in the four-day occupation of Mwendamboko Hill, a former 
artisanal mining site located on BanroÕs concession, where protestors engaged in what 
might be termed Ôguerilla miningÕ (cf. Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2015). The 
storming and occupation of this site were triggered by the death of Valrien Salumu 
Kalubu, an activist from the human rights organization la Voix de sans voix (Voice of 
the Voiceless). Kalubu was shot by a captain of the rapid intervention unit of the 
Congolese police that is contracted by Banro to guard its installations. At the very site 
where he died, close to BanroÕs compound, a grave was erected (see Figure 1). 
Having become a martyr of anti-Banro resistance, civil society organizations in 
Namoya now demand that a monument for Kalubu be erected at this site. 
 
 
Figure 1  Grave of human rights defender shot during a protest march against 
Banro near Namoya (Maniema).  
 
BanroÕs reactions to the events of January 2016 have further deteriorated the 
already tense relations between the company and NamoyaÕs inhabitants. Although it 
never followed through on the threat, its announcement to file a complaint against the 
president of the umbrella of civil society organizations and a local community radio 
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station, accused of ÔintoxicatingÕ the population, was widely denounced. Furthermore, 
while the police officer who shot the human rights activist was convicted by a 
military court, he has appealed the sentence. Many in Namoya believe that this appeal 
is supported by Banro, which was assigned civil responsibility for the activistÕs death 
and sentenced to a hefty fine and compensation. While BanroÕs support to the appeal 
could not be substantiated, the allegation is indicative of and feeds a general feeling 
that the company does not invest in ensuring the good behavior of the security 
personnel that it contracts. The rapid intervention unit that guards its installations is 
cited in various types of human rights abuses, like arresting and beating those mining 
illegally on BanroÕs concessions at night (Geenen and Verweijen 2017). This 
experienced climate of repression enhances the appeal for protestors to seek allies 
among factions that are able to mobilize force, including non-state armed actors. 
 
Industrial mining amidst militarization in Fizi-Kabambare 
 
During the Second Congo War, the FiziÐKabambare region was a hotbed of armed 
activity, as Mai-Mai groups predominantly led by commanders of Bembe origins 
fought the RCD. One of the main Mai-Mai forces was headquartered in Kilembwe 
(Lulenge sector), and directed by General Shabani Sikatenda. Having served with 
Laurent-Dsir Kabila in the PRP rebellion in nearby Hewa Bora, Sikatenda had 
become an officer in the government forces under KabilaÕs presidency. His Mai-Mai 
forces made regular incursions into the neighboring Namoya area, including the 
RCD-occupied artisanal gold mines. Another Bembe commander, Dunia Lwendama 
Dewilo, operated more to the southeast, in the Ngandja sector of Fizi, which hosts the 
goldmines of Misisi. 
After the adoption of a peace accord in 2003, the Mai-Mai in Fizi were 
supposed to either integrate into the newly formed Congolese armed forces (FARDC) 
or to demobilize. The Mai-Mai from Ngandja, however, resisted both options. They 
were supported by local Bembe elites who felt that losing autonomous military 
capacity would weaken their power position. In combination with inter-community 
animosities between the Babembe and a Rwandophone group living in Fizi (the 
Banyamulenge), these considerations pushed one of DuniaÕs commanders, a certain 
Williame Amuri Yakotumba, to desert and launch a new rebel movement in 2007 
(Verweijen 2015a). In one of their first comprehensive declarations, the movement 
states that Ôthe Mai-Mai revolution starts in 1964 [É] and has as objective to revive 
the Lumumbist ideology (fight against injustice, dictatorship, defense of the 
fatherland, protection of the people and their resources)Õ (Mwenebatu 2008, 5). While 
placing themselves in the tradition of Lumumba and his anti-imperialist agenda, 
YakotumbaÕs Mai-Mai also employ virulent xenophobic discourses. In the same 
declaration, they list as the first two points of their political agenda: Ô1) Defending the 
soil and subsoil of Fizi territory coveted by Rwandan immigrants. 2) Defending the 
territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo against foreign forcesÕ 
(Mwenebatu 2008, 6). 
Discourses of autochthony and resistance against Ôresources plunder by 
foreign forcesÕ are widely shared in Fizi, and ensure a measure of popular and elite 
support for the Mai-Mai. But people also collaborate and comply with the Mai-Mai 
out of opportunism and fear (Verweijen 2015a). The group engages in intimidation, 
extortion, kidnapping opponents, revenge attacks and banditry-style revenue 
generation, such as ambushes. They also derive revenue from artisanal gold mining 
sites in their main areas of influence, in particular around Misisi. Aside from 
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imposing ÔtaxesÕ on artisanal miners, pit owners and gold traders, they receive regular 
donations from befriended businesspeople and the main cooperative of artisanal 
miners in Misisi, the Cooprative minire de Kimbi. This cooperative was set up by 
the powerful customary chief of Misisi, Katombo MÕMunga WÕElongo, who 
previously had good relations with the Mai-Mai Yakotumba (UNSC 2011).  
Due to KatomboÕs influential position, not least his good contacts with the 
Mai-Mai, the mineral exploration company CASA started to co-opt him when 
arriving in the area in 2010. Thus, they granted him favors in exchange for his 
facilitating the companyÕs activities. For instance, to guard its compound, CASA 
contracted Fizilux, a small private security company co-created by chief Katombo. 
However, this strategy of co-optation backfired. Considering that Katombo did not 
sufficiently redistribute the benefits he obtained from CASA, a part of his family 
began to protest his leadership in 2014. When a peaceful sit-in in front of the chiefÕs 
house remained without results, they solicited a former Mai-Mai officer now working 
in the mineral business to attack Misisi, as described at the start of this paper. 
Supported by KatomboÕs family, this officer and his group, who subsequently joined 
the Mai-Mai Yakotumba, spread the message that ÔKatombo had sold Akyanga to 
CASAÕ, and that all artisanal miners would soon be thrown out. The attack forced 
CASA to scale down its activities, and led to KatomboÕs temporary abdication as 
chief. It also became the starting point of a strategy by the Mai-Mai Yakotumba to 
profile themselves as ÔdefendersÕ of the ASM sector, which allowed them to demand 
increasing contributions from local economic operators fearful of future LSM-induced 
livelihood losses. They were supported in this effort by General Sikatenda, who 
organized popular meetings in Misisi to denounce the expansion of LSM. 
After retiring from the national armed forces around 2010, General Sikatenda 
returned to his native village in FiziÕs Lulenge sector. While no longer holding an 
official function, the general, who keeps approximately 20 army soldiers as 
bodyguards, developed into a local strongman. By lobbying the governor of South 
Kivu, he managed to change the sector chief of Lulenge three times in recent years. 
The general also maintains contacts with various local Mai-Mai groups, including 
YakotumbaÕs, which he provides with advice and assistance. As he states, he wants to 
teach these groups how to behave more like ÔrevolutionariesÕ, based on his 
experiences in KabilaÕs Hewa Bora rebellion which had an anti-imperialist orientation 
(interview, Kilembwe, December 2011). He also attempts to discipline the army, 
tearing down all army roadblocks in his zone of influence, which are primarily 
erected to levy fees from road-users. Such actions have earned him a modicum of 
popularity, although many people also fear him. When heading the national military 
intelligence agency, Sikatenda built up a reputation for brutality, leading to his 
nickname ÔngumaÕ (boa or python in Lingala). SikatendaÕs influence is further 
underpinned by his relative wealth, which he derives from a wide range of business 
activities. These include ASM activities in Namoya and Misisi, where he has stone-
crushing machines, intermediaries who buy gold, and digging teams that are deployed 
to mining pits without paying the owner, a common practice of extortion by the state 
security services. 
 Although doing more business in Misisi, BanroÕs presence in Namoya 
threatens SikatendaÕs revenue-generation activities there. This may have contributed 
to his decision, described above, to send his bodyguards to occupy a part of BanroÕs 
concession at the start of 2013. While rapid intervention police deployed from 
ManiemaÕs capital eventually managed to dislodge the generalÕs group, Sikatenda has 
remained a menace to the company. The fact that the main access road to Namoya 
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runs through his fief plays no small part in this. Thus, Banro goes out of its way to 
ÔpacifyÕ the general, providing him, for instance, generously with fuel whenever he 
shows up in Salamabila. SikatendaÕs contacts with various armed groups, including 
the Mai-Mai Yakotumba, further fan such fears. While never having specifically 
targeted Banro, which only transits through their fief, YakotumbaÕs group declares to 
be against the company, accusing them of ÔimperialismÕ and Ôresources plunderÕ 
(interview Mai-Mai political representative, Uvira, April 2014). Furthermore, towards 
the end of 2016, armed bands emerged that started to attack vehicles of BanroÕs 
logistics subcontractors close to Namoya. In September 2016, a convoy transporting 
mining equipment and fuel was assaulted, with six trucks being burned and all drivers 
kidnapped (Wilson 2016). On 31 December 2016, a similar attack occurred, again 
involving kidnappings and damage inflicted on two vehicles  (Radio Okapi 2017). 
While there is no conclusive evidence about the attackersÕ relations to Sikatenda, 
these incidents do occur close to his fief, raising suspicions about his support. For 
Banro, these events have inflated existing concerns about armed group activity in its 
zones of passage and operations. These fears had already prompted its logistics 
subcontractors to equip their drivers with envelopes with money to distribute to 
emissaries of armed groups along the road, in order to ward off ambushes (Sheck 
2015). This practice underscores how armed actors may benefit from LSM through 
extracting Ôprotection rentsÕ.  
Aside from his ties to armed groups with an anti-Banro agenda, Sikatenda 
forms a threat to the company as he actively incites the population against LSM. In 
2015, he held public meetings in Misisi and Namoya, encouraging the population to 
revolt against CASA and Banro, accused of usurping the populationÕs ancestral 
grounds and of ÔimperialismÕ. Furthermore, in the antagonistic climate that reigned in 
Namoya after the bloody events of January 2016, several local leaders declared that 
Sikatenda was on their side. In the words of a chief: ÔSikatenda, he has become the 
advocate of the population. When he arrives here, he does not arrive but to 
attack/criticize Banro. ÒWhy do you abuse the population?Ó That is his goalÕ 
(interview, Salamabila, April 2016). Indeed, due to his pronounced anti-Kinshasa 
attitude and his reputation as fearless when it comes to defying the authorities, 
Sikatenda is seen as one of the few leaders willing and able to stand up against the 
powerful interests facilitating BanroÕs presence. Furthermore, in the face of 
(potentially) repressive practices from the authorities and security services in 
Namoya, only a leader able to mobilize force is seen to constitute a credible 
counterweight. Hence, when looking at the eastern CongoÕs political opportunity 
structure for contentious collective action, SikatendaÕs appeal as an ally in 
mobilization against Banro becomes clear.   
Despite this appeal, Sikatenda is widely feared due to his brutal actions, like 
the habitude to flog his opponents in public. Additionally, his military status elicits 
doubts about collaboration. As a civil society activist declared: ÔWeÉwe also fear 
him, how can we associate him to engage in purely civilian affairs? He is a military. If 
he arrives here he intimidates no matter whomÕ (interview, Salamabila, April 2016). 
Furthermore, Sikatenda is distrusted by the Bangubangu, the majority group in 
Salamabila, who believe he primarily defends the Babembe. Others also believe he is 
opportunistic, and therefore susceptible to being co-opted by Banro and to sell out on 
the populationÕs interests. In sum, SikatendaÕs status and impact on social 
mobilization are ambiguous, reflecting the complex position of politico-military 
entrepreneurs in the eastern CongoÕs militarized political-economic order.  
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Concluding remarks 
 
The above analysis shows that the principal mechanisms linking LSM to violent 
conflict as identified by Holden and Jacobson (2007), namely, protection rents, 
militarization stifling opposition and grievances creating support for rebellion, apply 
to the context of Fizi-Kabambare. Yet, these mechanisms do not fully capture the 
observed interplay between LSM and armed mobilization. While LSM companies like 
Banro indeed provide armed actors with resources by paying protection rents, these 
payments are part of a wider and more fine-grained politics of co-opting politico-
military entrepreneurs. Such cooptation may also assume the form of providing favors 
to civilian political actors that are in close contact with armed groups, like using their 
companies as subcontractors. Furthermore, while the expansion of LSM fuels 
militarization, this does not only lead to increased support for politico-military 
entrepreneurs via growing repression and grievances. It also fuels a rising demand for 
protection from such entrepreneurs by intensifying Ôconcessionary politicsÕ, 
enkindling conflicts and competition between local elite networks seeking to reap the 
benefits of LSM expansion. At the same time, the grievances and conflicts that allow 
politico-military entrepreneurs to reinforce their position are not a given: these 
entrepreneurs actively contribute to the framing and sometimes inflation of 
experienced injustices, drawing on deeply engrained collective action frames like 
discourses of autochthony and anti-imperialism.  
While politico-military entrepreneurs thus inspire and support resistance 
against LSM, this support often has a self-interested dimension. They may, for 
instance, seize upon protest to reinforce their own negotiating position vis--vis LSM 
companies, or capitalize on local businesspeopleÕs fears for LSM-induced revenue 
losses to demand increased contributions. Hence, in some cases, resistance becomes 
ÔappropriatedÕ by politico-military entrepreneurs and their factional interests, 
reflecting a generalized practice among local elites (Geenen and Verweijen 2017). 
Certainly, this appropriation does not go uncontested by civilians, who do not always 
want to be associated with violent actors that extort the very artisanal miners and 
peasants whose rights they claim to defend. Yet, in a militarized politicalÐeconomic 
order, the political opportunity structure for collective contentious action is skewed 
towards forging alliances with factions able to manipulate force.  
The ambiguous position of politico-military entrepreneurs raises the question 
to what extent their violent actions against LSM companies can be qualified as forms 
of Ôpopular resistanceÕ. Dominant discourses in policy and media circles ascribe the 
malpractices of present-day armed groups in the eastern Congo to their 
ÔcriminalizationÕ, which would constitute a departure from the supposedly more 
ideologically oriented rebellions and the Ôrural radicalismÕ of earlier epochs 
(Verweijen and Marijnen 2016). Such readings neglect that contemporary politico-
military entrepreneurs do voice widely shared grievances, including discontent with 
the current politicalÐeconomic order, and advocate for change, even if such efforts 
invariably coexist with self-interested, abusive and predatory behavior (Verweijen 
2016). Throughout the CongoÕs history, armed rebellion has been a mixture of 
varying, and sometimes seemingly contradictory, political visions, projects and 
interests. Social mobilization has been equally ambiguous, often lacking well 
delineated ideologies and clearly identifiable social movements. Emerging from 
ongoing, but sometimes silent discontent, it rather tends to be expressed in a moment, 
in actions by ad hoc coalitions or by groups that may be versatile in their positions. 
Moreover, within the volatility of the eastern CongoÕs militarized environment, the 
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frictions and uncertainties provoked by resistance tend to fuel dynamics that 
eventually reproduce, rather than transform, the political-economic order (cf. de Waal 
and Ibreck 2013).  
Recent scholarship on social movements in Africa similarly emphasizes the 
Ômessy, ideologically confusedÕ and Ôinherently contradictoryÕ nature of contentious 
politics on the continent (Larmer 2010, 260). Yet, as concluded by Larmer (2010, 
252) the fact that social movements are  
 
Ôan expression of the contradictions and hierarchies of the society in which 
they operate [É] does not make them ÒinauthenticÓ representatives of the poor 
or exploited; rather, it makes them venues or spaces in which political 
difference is articulated in societies characterized by inequality, exploitation 
and social conflictÕ. 
 
Furthermore, in volatile conditions, versatility may be as much a strength as a 
weakness. Crucially, it allows for transcending (socially constructed) boundaries that 
structure deeply engrained understandings of socio-political order, notably the 
rural/urban; state/non-state and military/civilian divides. The conditions of 
multifaceted insecurity, violence and conflict that shape peopleÕs agency in unsettled 
contexts, including their engagement in contentious action, cut across these 
boundaries, and so does contentious action itself.  
The boundary-transcending nature of resistance in the Congo raises questions 
about the pertinence of drawing sharp lines between armed and social mobilization. 
Analyzing African social movements, de Waal and Ibreck (2013, 305) conclude that 
violent action Ôundermines the potential for non-violent popular uprisingsÕ and erodes 
Ôthe promise of transformative collective actionÕ. Yet such a conceptualization of 
violent action risks obscuring the fine-grained interplay between armed and social 
mobilization and the ways this interplay shapes and is shaped by the same political 
opportunity structures and mobilizing discourses. As Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 138) 
state: Ôvarious forms of contention overlap, mutate into each other; and result from 
similar mechanisms and processes in different combinations, sequences, and initial 
conditionsÕ. Hence observing armed and social mobilization through the same 
Ôcontentious politicsÕ lens, while analyzing their interconnections and shared 
contentious repertoires, may be analytically more fruitful than to conceptualize them 
as distinct or antagonistic phenomena. After all, leaders of armed resistance and the 
discourses they employ have proven to be enduring sources of inspiration also for 
non-violent resistance. This is well demonstrated by the appeal that the militarized 
figure of ÔGeneral LuddÕ enjoys even among the non-violent side of the neo-Luddite 
spectrum (Banning 2001). As concluded by Navickas (2005: 284): ÔÒGeneral LuddÓ 
was perhaps only the most visible manifestation of what was in fact a mythology of 
Luddism, a whole mindframe of opposition which was framed by both participants in, 
and suppressors of, the disturbances.Õ From this mythological point of view, the 
politico-military entrepreneurs engaging in violent practices against industrial mining 
companies may, in fact, be Luddites in the Congo. 	
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